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Designing Efficient Infrastructural Investment and
Asset Transfer Mechanisms in Humanitarian Supply
Chains
We analyze the efficacy of different asset transfer mechanisms and provide policy recommendations for the
design of humanitarian supply chains. As a part of their preparedness effort, humanitarian organizations
often make decisions on resource investments ex-ante because doing so allows for rapid response if an adverse
event occurs. However, programs typically operate under funding constraints and donor earmarks with
autonomous decision-making authority resting with the local entities, which makes the design of efficient
humanitarian supply chains a challenging problem. We formulate this problem in an agency setting with two
independent aid programs, where different asset transfer mechanisms are considered and where investments
in resources are of two types: a primary resource that is needed for providing the aid, and infrastructural
investments that improve the operation of the aid program in using the primary resource. The primary
resource is modeled as either a divisible or indivisible good, and is acquired from earmarked donations. We
show that allowing aid programs the flexibility of transferring primary resources improves the efficiency of
the system by yielding greater social welfare than when this flexibility does not exist. More importantly,
we show that a central entity that can acquire primary resources from one program and sell them to the
other program can further improve system efficiency by providing a mechanism that facilitates the transfer
of primary resources and eliminates losses from gaming. This outcome is achieved without depriving the
individual aid programs of their decision-making autonomy while maintaining the constraints under which
they operate. We find that outcomes with centralized resource transfer but decentralized infrastructural
investments by the aid programs are the same as with a completely centralized system (where both resource
transfer and infrastructural investments are centralized).
Key words : asset transfer; humanitarian logistics; supply chain design
History :
1. Introduction
The field of humanitarian logistics has recently received greater attention as scholars recognize
similarities and differences in the specific needs of supply chains in response to disasters vis-a-vis
supply chains in the private sector (Van Wassenhove 2006, Gupta 2011, Holguin-Veras et al. 2012).
One important difference in the nature of these supply chains is the set of objectives targeted by
profit versus nonprofit organizations (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009a). Yet there are many
other differences between the design requirements of humanitarian logistics systems and those of
corporate supply chains (Holguin-Veras et al. 2012). Logistics involved in disaster response are
typically reactive and are set up temporarily with specific functional elements in mind (Jahre
et al. 2009), but they still require extensive planning and coordination for successful operation
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2(Balcik et al. 2010). Such planning and coordination activities are often needed in advance of
the actual events and must bear potential factors (e.g., geography, regional sensitivity to future
events) in mind. Thus, the planning of humanitarian logistics systems has three main focus areas:
preparedness, response, and collaboration (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b).
To facilitate rapid response to adverse events such as natural disasters, it is imperative that aid
programs establish their resource needs as early as possible and acquire their primary resources. An
obvious example would be transportation assets like trucks, planes, and earth moving equipment,
which are large and expensive resources, and have to be adapted to the various situations in which
their deployment is an appropriate response. Other examples of primary resources could be pre-
positioned relief items, where the decisions to invest in these primary resources are made based on
earmarked donations. Note that we use the terms “primary resources” and “assets” interchangeably
in the paper. The aid programs are also required to invest in an infrastructure to make good use of
these primary resources, e.g., logistics or maintenance skills, driver training or warehouse operating
equipment. Resource planning and allocation are therefore important aspects of the preparedness
and response activities of aid organizations.
In this paper, we analyze the allocation and use of expensive resources by humanitarian logistics
programs under the context-specific field conditions that make these activities a complex and
challenging problem. First, in contrast to corporate supply chains (which are financed by revenues
from ongoing operations) and to entrepreneurial ventures (which are financed from private and
corporate venture capital), aid programs typically finance their operations using donations from
various government and non-government organizations and/or individuals . Second, if a donor has
provided resources to an organization that is addressing some particular situation, then the donor
likely and reasonably expects that the resources will be used for that situation. In this way the
funding for resources is “earmarked”, which makes it difficult for aid programs to share or pool
resources (ICRC 2011)1. We analyze a set of transfer mechanisms and ownership structures for
aid programs that operate under these constraints, and we investigate the efficacy of different
mechanisms for achieving the benefits of collaboration.
To illustrate the types of situations modeled in this paper, consider the following context. Given
that Indonesia is one of the most disaster-prone areas in the world, humanitarian organizations need
to design their supply networks such that when disaster strikes, response can be fast. This means
1 The ICRC (2011) report states that donors can earmark donations based on the country of their choice and for an
activity of their choice, and the International Committee of the Red Cross provides a list of programs currently being
conducted for this purpose.
3establishing a logistical hub in the region with a warehouse where relief items can be pre-positioned,
transportation assets like helicopters and trucks can be stationed and maintained, and logisticians
can be trained. These supply network design decisions, preparedness in humanitarian speak, are
mostly taken under rather severe budget constraints. Moreover, donations are often earmarked,
so collaboration with other parties is far from obvious (Loescher 2001). Clearly, humanitarian
organizations with different mandates, religious or country affiliations, may not be allowed to share
or pool resources. But even a single organization like the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) can be strongly decentralized with independent National Societies
receiving earmarked donations from the respective local governments. Another very decentralized
organization is World Vision International (WVI). Its aid programs are funded by donors who may
allocate a budget for five years to treat malaria in a province of Kenya. The program would be run
by doctors, deal with hundreds of villages, and its budget may or may not include a provision for the
procurement of vehicles and spare parts. There may be other WVI aid programs in the same region,
sponsored by different donors and dealing with other issues like schooling or sanitation. The WVI
programs are run independently and typically the vehicles for the malaria program are not supposed
to be used to help out another program, i.e. they are strictly earmarked. In emergency situations
sometimes vehicle transfers are allowed but the administrative procedures to make the flexibility
possible are long and tedious, i.e. may take several weeks or more. In short, the humanitarian world
deals with scarcity of resources, decentralized decision-making and earmarked donations. These
conditions severely constrain their actions. Note that these conditions are typically not an issue
in commercial supply chains. Unfortunately most, if not all humanitarian supply chain literature
ignores these key characteristics and assumes unlimited resources, free allocation and centralized
decision-making.
In this paper, we shall ask the following questions. Can mechanisms be designed to maintain the
need for earmarking of donations and autonomous decision-making by individual aid programs,
and yet maximize the efficiency of humanitarian aid programs? What is the nature of such mecha-
nisms? Can these mechanisms obtain the coordinated solution to the joint problem of multiple aid
organizations? What is the role of central planning agents in such systems?
To study these questions, we use a stylized model to formulate the problem of two aid programs
in three different settings: (1) when no transfer of primary resources is allowed between the aid
programs; (2) when each aid program is allowed to transfer its primary assets to another program
(provided the other program needs the resource and the program that owns it does not); and
(3) when each aid program has the option to sell the primary asset to a central entity if it does
4not need it; the central entity can then sell the primary asset to the other aid program. Each
program procures its primary resource using earmarked donations. We also model each program
as making upfront program-specific infrastructural investments to facilitate effective use of the
primary resource. An example would be setting up a fleet management unit to maintain vehicles,
manage spare-parts inventories, and train mechanics. The operational efficiency of primary assets
like trucks for deployment and support will be increasing in the investment in the fleet management
unit. Building infrastructure to effectively use primary resources has a long lead time, and hence
such investments must be sunk at the beginning of the planning period. We characterize the overall
utility derived by the different parties in each of these three cases and then compare the net social
welfare generated by the different cases. The main contribution of this paper is as follows: in the
design of humanitarian relief networks, we show that coordination entities that exist in practice
perform an important role in making humanitarian relief networks efficient by facilitating the
transfer of resources between different elements of the supply chain.
Our setup includes four critical, practice-driven features of the parties’ humanitarian aid efforts.
First, we model the primary resource as being acquired based on earmarked donations only, if the
primary resource is expensive, only one party can acquire it. Second, since the funding provided by
donors is earmarked, the resources cannot be jointly acquired and used by the two aid programs.
Third, the programs maintain autonomy in making program-specific infrastructural investment
decisions. Fourth, these programs may be part of the same humanitarian organization, or can belong
to different organizations, in which case, the central entity would be an inter-organizational agency.
For example, in the case of fleet management, an inter-organizational initiative like the Fleet Forum
could fulfill the additional role of the central entity. The Fleet Forum was founded in 2003 as a
joint initiative of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and World Vision International (WVI). Today, the Fleet
Forum is an association of more than 40 members, including NGOs, international organizations,
the UN, academic institutions, donors and corporate partners (http://fleetforum.org/about/). The
thrust of the paper is focused on policy recommendations for the structural design of humanitarian
supply chains, and identifying conditions under which these inter-organizational agencies that
facilitate the transfer of resources between different agencies make the supply chain more efficient.
Our results may be summarized as follows. We first show that in both the cases of the primary
resource being either an indivisible or divisible good, a rank ordering exists between the net social
welfare generated by the three cases just described, and we show that the social welfare in Case 3,
with the central entity, is the highest. We also show that the net social welfare generated in this case
5is equal to the system-optimal social welfare, which means that it is possible for system efficiency to
be maximized even under the constraints of expensive assets, donor earmarks for specific programs,
and autonomy in decision-making for the aid-programs. In this scenario, the central entity either
can extract all the additional surplus generated by the system or can subsidize the operating cost
of the two aid programs; thus, we show that aid program designs involving a central entity can
achieve a wide variety of objectives. If each program is allowed both to invest and to transfer
resources, as in Case 2, then the net social welfare generated is higher than with the system in
which resource transfer is not allowed (i.e., Case 1).
While the trend of increased earmarking by donors is understandable given their concerns for
efficient use of the funds and corresponding desire for higher accountability and traceability we
show that, earmarking primary resource funding can be counter-productive and have perverse
effects. We show that efficient transfer mechanisms of the primary resource can be designed, with
adequate compensation between programs, and such mechanisms eliminate the perverse effects of
earmarking, yet maintain the accountability of donor funds.
We show that system designs in which individual aid programs are responsible for managing
their primary resources are suboptimal and that their efficiency can be improved by facilitating
the transfer of these resources. Giving each program the right to transfer the primary resource
yields greater welfare benefits than denying that option, yet leads to a lower welfare than the case
where resource transfer is facilitated via a centralized entity. The mechanisms developed in this
paper provide normative guidelines for the optimal design of humanitarian supply chains capable of
resolving the practical constraints—mainly resource constraints, earmarks, and autonomy—faced
by humanitarian aid organizations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of the
literature on investments in preparedness and response and of past studies addressing collaborative
efforts in humanitarian logistics. Section 3 details the model’s assumptions and formulation as
well as our analysis of the model results. We conclude in Section 3.2 by summarizing the paper’s
contributions and outlining directions for future research.
2. Extant Literature
The literature on designing resource procurement and allocation systems can be divided into the
streams directed at the functions of preparedness, response, and collaboration (Kovacs and Spens
2007, Apte 2009, Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009b). In the area of resource preparedness,
Ozdamar et al. (2004) study the planning of emergency logistics for adverse events (e.g., future nat-
ural disasters) as a vehicle routing problem, Barabarosoglu et al. (2002) analyze helicopter logistics
6for disaster relief operations, and de Silva (2001) studies planning methodologies for evacuation.
Salmeron and Apte (2010) explore a two-stage stochastic optimization problem; the first stage
focuses on designing the supply chain for relief resources, and the second stage focuses on response
logistics. Similarly, Hwang (1999) studies the design of a food distribution system that could be
deployed in the event of a natural disaster. Long (1997) examines the role of information systems
in determining the success of disaster relief operations. Our paper differs from this stream of lit-
erature in that we focus on the coordination of multiple aid programs to solve a more generalized
problem in the design of resource procurement and allocation systems.
In the area of funding for disaster preparedness, Toyasaki and Wakolbinger (2011) report that
obtaining appropriate earmarked donations for specific projects is difficult; the funding provided
typically overshoots or undershoots the amount of resources required to provide relief. Concretely,
this could imply a WVI program in Kenya has ample funds to buy vehicles and spare parts, while
another program within the same region with a different donor may be short of funds to buy
the necessary vehicles to operate effectively. Thomas (2003) identifies funding as one of the main
bottlenecks in designing efficient disaster response systems. Vayrynen (2001) finds that there is
a huge multiplicity of agencies with funding offering relief, and “in reality, the actions of these
multiple agencies are seldom effectively coordinated and they may even undermine each other. This
situation is likely to continue as the establishment of more centralized structures of governance in
humanitarian relief looks unlikely”. This paper addresses the need for flexible supply chain design
to mitigate for the mismatch between the available resources and demand when adverse events
occur in different situations.
While there are a number of studies that look at the roles of different agencies acting in response
to adverse events, Loescher (2001) finds that the interests of different agencies may collide, and
each agency desires to maintain decision-making autonomy to satisfy the goals of the stakeholders.
Similarly, Saab et al. (2008) find that multilateral agency coordination faces many challenges,
and coordination bodies that are formed to coordinate actions differ on a variety of dimensions
including funding mechanisms and autonomy. Hence, the troika of funding constraints, earmarked
donations and decision-making autonomy creates a specific set of challenges for designing effective
humanitarian response supply chains. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been
tackled before.
In the literature on disaster response, Murray (2005) finds that humanitarian aid programs are
employing many of the best logistical practices used in corporate supply chains to reduce lead times
and improve response quality. Pettit and Beresford (2005) analyze the efficiency of using a mix of
7military and nongovernmental aid agencies to provide emergency relief response. Several studies
consider the role of infrastructure and transport connectivity in the response to natural disasters
(e.g., Long and Wood 1995, Cassidy 2003). Our paper differs from that stream of literature because
it focuses on the procurement and investment of resources in the preparedness phase of responding
to adverse events such as natural disasters.
Finally, a number of studies consider the collaboration between different aid programs in human-
itarian logistics. There is ample empirical and anecdotal evidence of precious little collaboration
or coordination between different aid agencies in response to adverse events (Chomilier et al. 2003,
McClintock 2005, Murray 2005). A lack of collaboration can lead to the duplication of some efforts
and to insufficient scale in others (Simpson 2005). Collaboration need not be limited to nongovern-
mental organizations; it can also include the private sector and local communities (Tomasini and
Van Wassenhove 2009a, Starr and Van Wassenhove 2011).
There are many other references to humanitarian logistics in the literature, and this number is
rapidly exploding. The key point to be made here is that nearly all of this work assumes a central
decision maker, little or no resource constraints, and non-earmarked funds. However, the reality of
humanitarian organizations is precisely that they are almost always highly resource constrained,
decentralized and subject to earmarked funding. For instance, Pedraza Martinez et al. (2010) study
the alignment of incentives to coordinate a fleet of vehicles owned by different aid programs. Our
paper contributes to the collaborative stream of research by analyzing the impact of differently
designed mechanisms (for resource procurement and allocation) on the potential of collaboration
between aid programs constrained by scarce funding and donor earmarks.
3. Model Description, Formulation, and Analysis
In this section, we describe the model setting and state our assumptions. The thrust of the paper
is to make policy recommendations for the structural design of humanitarian supply chains, and
not for decision support for individual relief efforts. The sequence of events in our model is as
follows. There are two aid programs, i=A,B, and each program needs a primary resource in the
event that aid must be provided. A primary resource must be lined up ex ante, before the planning
horizon, because the lead time necessary to acquire primary resources can be long. In addition to
procuring the primary resource, both programs must also make specific, up-front investments in
building an “infrastructure” for effectively utilizing the primary resource. We use xA and xB to
denote the respective program-specific infrastructural investments made by parties A and B. If an
adverse event occurs for either party i, then providing aid services in response to that event yields
8the utility ui(xi) for the affected party—provided the primary resource is at its disposal. We shall
make the following four assumptions regarding the model parameters and problem constraints.
Assumption 1 : Funding for primary resources is earmarked, so aid programs cannot share pri-
mary resources if they need them for their own purpose. If primary resources are not needed by an
aid program, then it may transfer it to another program that may require the resources provided
that the other program adequately compensates the donor program. This assumption reflects our
observations in the field: donors require that funding provided for a specific purpose actually be
used for that purpose.
Assumption 2 : We assume that if a program has the resource and if an adverse situation occurs
that requires its response, then the program will utilize the resource and not transfer it to another
program (even when it could earn a surplus from doing so), thereby honoring the concerns of
donors.
Assumption 3 : Program i will make its own infrastructure investment decision. Assumption 3
models the decision-making autonomy of the individual aid programs.
Assumption 4 : Aid program i’s utility from responding to an event with the infrastructural
investment xi is given by ui(xi); here ui(xi) is strictly concave and increasing, ui(0) = 0, and
u
′
i(0) =∞. The response utility is strictly positive; however, this assumption does not mean that
the program benefits from the event. Rather, the program accrues utility from having secured a
primary resource that enables it to respond immediately to any event.
3.1. Model Formulation and Analysis for indivisible primary goods
In this section, we discuss and analyze our three paradigmatic cases when the primary resource is
indivisible, e.g. helicopters or small planes as the primary resource, that are needed to access two
distinct regions of a country that are difficult to access by ground transport. Such resources are
expensive, hence, their acquisition is limited based on the earmarked donations available to the two
aid programs. For this case, to model the funding constraint, we make the additional assumption
that the primary resource is so expensive that only one program has the funds to acquire it, and
the other program does not. Without loss of generality, we assume a priori that Program A has the
earmarked funding to purchase the resource but that Program B does not. This assumption thus
reflects the scarcity of funding faced by aid agencies. Also note that assuming that both programs
have (or both do not have) earmarked funds to acquire the primary resource yields trivial situations
where there is no requirement for resource transfer. In Section 4 we will relax this assumption when
we consider the case of divisible goods.
9In this section, we assume that the probability of an adverse event requiring assistance from
program i only is given by qi, and the probability that both programs have to provide disaster relief
is given by qAB. Hence, the probability that program A needs to provide disaster relief is given
by pA = qA + qAB, and the probability that program B needs to provide disaster relief is given by
pB = qB + qAB. This formulation models that the demand for both programs could be correlated,
and has a coefficient of correlation ρ= qAB−pApB√
pApB(1−pA)(1−pB)
.
We begin by describing the first case, in which transfer of the primary resource between the
programs is not allowed.
3.1.1. Primary Resource Nontransferable. Since, Program A has the required earmarked
funding to purchase the primary resource, its net surplus is uA(xA)pA − xA − c, where xA is its
infrastructure investment. Program A’s problem is given by
max
xA≥0
uA(xA)pA−xA− c.
From the first-order conditions, Program A should make the up-front infrastructural investment
given by duA(xA)
dxA
= 1/pA, let x˜A be the solution to A’s problem that satisfies this equation. We
compute the net social welfare in this case, which is equal to the combined utility surplus of the two
programs. Since Program B does not have the required funding to procure the primary resource
and in this case transfer of the resource from A to B is not allowed, Program B will not make any
infrastructure investment. Therefore, the joint utility in this case is Π1 = uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A− c as the
net utility of Program B is zero; here Π1 denotes the net social welfare in Case 1.
Admittedly, this is an artificial case we include to facilitate a comparison of different transfer
mechanisms studied in this paper. In practice, transfers are mostly feasible but may require long
and tedious procedures to obtain donor agreement. Note that in emergency situations, these long
lead times are quasi-equivalent to non-allowed resource transfers since the relief would come too
late anyway.
3.1.2. Primary Resource Transferable If Not Utilized by Acquirer. In this case, Pro-
gram A has the option to transfer the primary resource to Program B if it does not require the
resource and Program B does. Note that in this case both programs make infrastructural invest-
ments for using the primary resource, even though only Program A has guaranteed access to it
(Habib and Johnsen 1999). The program that owns the primary resource has the first right of use,
but the resource can be transferred if this program does not actually need to utilize it.
Since the primary resource is procured using earmarked donations, in case of a transfer the
donor program must be adequately compensated to maintain the constraints levied by earmarking.
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Therefore, it is important to determine the transfer price between the programs to analyze this
case. A general way to determine the transfer price of the primary resource is to use the Generalized
Nash bargaining (GNB) framework. Under the GNB framework, if Program B needs to use the
primary resource but Program A does not (this event has a probability of qB), the ex-post expected
Generalized Nash bargaining surplus is given by [uB(xB)−pT ]1−βpβT , where pT is the transfer price
and the bargaining power of Program B is (1− β) and that of Program A is β. Note that A’s
surplus does not include its investments in the primary resource and infrastructure, since they
are sunk. Maximizing the bargaining surplus results in the transfer price of pT = βuB(xB). Hence,
under the GNB framework, if the primary resource is transferred by Program A to Program B,
the surplus accruing to Program B is given by uB(xB)− pT = (1− β)uB(xB) and the surplus for
Program A is given by pT = βuB(xB).
We next characterize the infrastructure-specific investments of both aid programs.
Using the transfer price pT , Program A solves the following problem to determine its infrastruc-
ture investment,
max
xA≥0
uA(xA)pA +βuB(xB)qB −xA− c.
It is clear that x˜A solves Program A’s problem, where x˜A is as in Section 3.1.1. Program B’s
problem is
max
xB≥0
(1−β)uB(xB)qB −xB.
From the first-order conditions, Program B should make the infrastructural investment given by
(1− β)duB(xB)
dxB
= 1/qB. Let xˆB be the solution to Program B’s problem. The joint utility in this
case is Π2 = uA(x˜A)pA+uB(xˆB)qB− xˆB− x˜A−c, where Π2 denotes the net social welfare in Case 2.
We now compare the net social welfare in Case 2 with that in Case 1.
Proposition 1: The net social welfare when the primary resource is transferable is greater than
when it is not transferable; that is, Π2 >Π1.
Proposition 1 is of interest because it confirms that the flexibility of transferring primary resource
ensures greater welfare for both programs—even though the assets cannot be jointly owned and one
of the programs does not have the funding to acquire the primary resource. Observe that investing
in the primary resource does not directly add utility to either program; rather, the flexibility of
having the primary resource to justify up-front infrastructural investments yields a higher utility
for Program B, which can now provide services should an adverse event occur within its territory.
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However, Program A also benefits from that flexibility because it can count as a surplus the funds
that it earns from the transfer when it does not utilize the resource.
Next, we analyze the case of a central entity that can buy the primary resource from Program
A if it does not need the primary resource, and sell it to Program B if the latter needs it.
3.1.3. Primary Resources can be Transferred to Central Entity. In this case, the aid
program A has the right to transfer its primary resource to a central entity if it does not require
the use of the primary resource, and the central entity can sell the primary resource to Program
B. As before, both programs make respective up-front infrastructural investments of xA and xB.
If Program A sells the primary resource it has acquired to the central entity, then the central
entity pays Program A with a fee of pC , and if the central entity sells the primary resource to
Program B, then Program B pays a fee of pS to the central entity. If A utilizes the resource, then
there are no transactions with the central entity. Program A’s problem of determining its optimal
infrastructural investment may be written as
max
xA≥0
uA(xA)pA + pC(1− pA)−xA.
It follows easily that x˜A is the solution to Program A’s problem. Program B’s problem is
max
xB≥0
(uB(xB)− pS)qB −xB.
Let x¯B be the solution to B’s problem; that solution is characterized by
duB(xB)
dxB
= 1/qB. The joint
utility in this case is Π3 = uA(x˜A)pA + uB(x¯B)qB − x˜A − x¯B − c, which is the net social welfare of
the entire system in Case 3 (i.e., the combined utilities of A and B and of the central entity, too).
We now compare the net social welfare generated in this case with that in Case 2.
Proposition 2: The net social welfare when the primary resource is transferable between two
programs (Case 2) is less than when a central entity can acquire the primary resource from one
program and then sell it to the other program (Case 3); that is, Π3 >Π2. Program A makes the same
infrastructural investment in Cases 2 and 3, whereas Program B makes a greater infrastructural
investment in Case 3 than in Case 2.
Proposition 2 shows that the central entity can Pareto-increase the two programs’ infrastructural
investments to levels that exceed those obtained in Case 2. The central entity has two advantages
compared to Case 2 where the two programs mutually agree on a resource transfer mechanism
without the involvement of a third-party.
First, the central entity eliminates the loss of efficiency due to the gaming in the system that
occurs in Case 2 because of the bargaining process that determines the transfer mechanism between
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the programs. Second, the central entity increases potentially the utility to Program A from the
relief effort by providing a salvage value to it of the primary resource that could be higher than
what it would obtain from Program B if Program B needed the primary resource and Program
A did not. In Case 2, Program A had to acquire the primary resource up front, and ran the risk
that this investment may not have been recouped if the adverse event did not happen. So that
the central entity is not transferring the financial burden of the primary resource, it can structure
the transfer payments pS and pC such that A is left with the same expected utility as in Case 2.
Program B could be offered a subsidy to facilitate B’s use of the primary resource.
It is most interesting that the central entity increases overall efficiency by extracting efficiency
gains from within the system, and these gains can be used (if needed) to subsidize a program’s use
of the primary resource. Therefore, this design of a humanitarian logistics system Pareto-dominates
the flexibility mechanism of Case 2. It is important to note that the efficiency gain in Case 3 is
not owed to any additional flexibility in the system — in both cases transfer of primary resource is
allowed — however, the gain stems from the design of the transfer process (facilitated via a central
entity or via direct transfer between the programs).
Corollary 1: The transfer payments pS and pC can be set in such a way that v
1
i < v
2
i ≤ v3i for
i∈ {A,B}, where vji denotes the expected utility of program i under Case j, and the central entity
does not have a negative expected surplus.
We now investigate whether the results of the system with a central entity can be improved.
Proposition 3: The net social welfare with a system that includes a central entity (Case 3)
is equal to that with a completely centralized system that employs the same resource allocation
policy and also entails centralized decision making for the infrastructural investments. With the
central entity, decentralized decision making in infrastructural investments does not induce any
inefficiency.
Proposition 3 shows that the net social welfare obtained by Case 3 cannot be improved upon, and
this bears several interesting implications for the design of humanitarian supply chains. First, the
current structure of these supply chains can be maintained (the earmarking and decision-making
autonomy constraints do not have to be violated) for the efficiency of the entire supply chain to
increase. Second, even if one program does not have donations required to purchase the primary
resource, it can still acquire the primary resource (and its relief effort can be subsidized) by the
presence of the central entity. Finally, such organizations do exist in practice; if they are empowered
to acquire and sell primary resources, then they can perform the supply chain efficiency function
by transferring primary resources between the two programs. We now investigate if the design
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of humanitarian supply chains can be improved if the primary good is divisible. This analysis is
conducted to check the robustness of the results and also to relax the assumption that only one
program has the donations to procure the primary resource.
3.2. Model Formulation and Analysis for divisible primary goods
In this section, we analyze the three resource transfer mechanisms described above when the
primary resource is divisible, e.g. if medicines, tents, or small transportation assets like motorcycles
are the primary resource. To keep the analysis consistent with the previous section, we model
that the primary resources procured are limited by the earmarked donations available to the two
aid programs. Let the primary resources available to Program i from its earmarked resources be
denoted as κi, and the demand for the primary resources in the case of an adverse event be denoted
by Di, where Di is assumed to be stochastic. We assume that E[(Di − κi)+] > 0, thus reflecting
the scarcity of funding faced by aid agencies. As in the previous case, let xi denote the investment
of Program i in its infrastructure. Finally, define the total response of Program i (the minimum of
the demand for the primary resource, and the total quantity of the primary resource it has) if it
needs to provide relief be given by ri. Note that ri includes the primary resources that Program i
has acquired with its earmarked donations, and any transfer of primary resources from the other
program. We make an additional assumption in this section.
Assumption 5 :The utility of Program i, ui(xi, ri) is jointly concave and increasing in xi and ri,
where xi and ri are complementary.
Assumption 5 ensures that a higher response to an adverse event yields a higher utility, and a
higher investment in infrastructure yields a higher utility; and the total response and the infrastruc-
ture cannot act as substitutes. Our results for the case where the primary resource is divisible apply
to all demand structures of the aid programs irrespective of their inter-relationship (correlated
demand or independent demand).
We begin by describing the first case, in which the aid programs (A and B) make their decisions
to acquire the primary resource independently and neither program is allowed to transfer that
resource.
3.2.1. Primary Resource Nontransferable. Let r˜i denote the total response of Program
i if an adverse event occurs. Since the primary resources are non-transferable in this case, the net
response of Programs A and B are given by r˜A = min(DA,κA) and r˜B = min(DB,κB) respectively.
If the net utility surplus of the two programs are given by U˜i, the problems of Programs A and
B are given by:
U˜A = max
xA≥0
E[uA(xA, r˜A)]−xA
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U˜B = max
xB≥0
E[uB(xB, r˜B)]−xB
Using the first-order conditions, Programs A and B should make the optimal up-front infras-
tructural investment x˜A and x˜B that are given by
dE[uA(xA,r˜A)]
dxA
= 1 and dE[uB(xB ,r˜B)]
dxB
= 1, where
x˜A and x˜B are the solutions to these two equalities. As before, the net social welfare is equal
to the combined utility surplus of the two programs. The joint expected utility in this case is
Π1 = E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] +E[uB(x˜B, r˜B)]− x˜A − x˜B; here Π1 denotes the net social welfare in Case 1.
Next we derive the net social welfare when both programs are allowed to transfer the excess primary
resources that they have to the other program.
3.2.2. Excess Primary Resources Transferable by Aid Programs. In this case, both
programs acquire the primary resource based on their earmarked donations, and after the realiza-
tion of their demand, they are allowed to transfer their excess primary resources if available to the
other aid program. As in the previous case, we use the GNB framework to determine the transfer
price of the excess primary resources. Given that the bargaining will happen ex-post the demand
realization, we start by determining the transfer price at which the two aid programs will transfer
the primary resource to the other if they have excess primary resources.
We start by identifying the transfer price at which Program B will transfer its excess resources
to Program A. Let the response functions of Programs A and B in this case be denoted by rˆA and
rˆB respectively. Given that the programs will only transfer their excess primary resources, rˆA and
rˆB are given by:
rˆA = min(DA, κA) + min{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}
rˆB = min(DB, κB) + min{(DB −κB)+, (κA−DA)+}
If Program B transfers its excess primary resources to Program A at a transfer price of pBA, then
the gains from the transfer for the two aid programs (A and B respectively) are given by:
GA = uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)− pBAmin{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}
GB = pBAmin{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}
The gain of Program A from the primary resources transferred from Program B is given by its net
utility gain compared to its utility from the previous case (no transfer of primary resources) minus
the cost that it pays Program B for the transferred primary resources, and the gain of Program
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B is the added revenue it attains from Program A for the transferred primary resources. Using
the GNB framework, the two parties solve maxpBAG
β
AG
1−β
B to determine the optimal value of pBA.
Similarly, if Program A transfers its excess primary resources to Program B the GNB framework
is used to determine the transfer price pAB. The values of the transfer prices pBA and pAB are given
by:
pBA =
(1−β)[uA(xA,rˆA)−uA(xA,r˜A)]
min{(DA−κA)+,(κB−DB)+} if min{(DA−κA)
+, (κB −DB)+}> 0
pAB =
β[uB(xB ,rˆB)−uB(xB ,r˜B)]
min{(DB−κB)+,(κA−DA)+} if min{(DB −κB)
+, (κA−DA)+}> 0
The net utility surplus Uˆi of the two aid programs are then given by:
UˆA =E[uA(xA, rˆA)]− (1−β)E[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)] +βE[uB(xB, rˆB)−uB(xB, r˜B)]−xA
UˆB =E[uB(xB, rˆB)]−βE[uB(xB, rˆB)−uB(xB, r˜B)] + (1−β)E[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)]−xB
We next characterize the infrastructure-specific investments of both aid programs. Using the first-
order conditions for the above expressions yields the optimal infrastructural investments of Pro-
grams A and B that are given by dE[uA(xA,rˆA)]
dxA
−(1−β)dE[uA(xA,rˆA)−uA(xA,r˜A)]
dxA
= 1, and dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)]
dxB
−
β dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)−uB(xB ,r˜B)]
dxB
= 1 respectively. Let xˆA and xˆB denote the optimal infrastructural invest-
ments of the two aid programs.
In this case, Π2 = βE[uA(xA, rˆA)] + (1 − β)E[uA(xA, r˜A)] − xˆA + (1 − β)E[uB(xB, rˆB)] +
βE[uB(xB, r˜B)]− xˆB denotes the net social welfare.
Proposition 4: The net social welfare with divisible primary resources that are transferable is
greater than when the primary resources are not transferable; that is, Π2 >Π1.
Proposition 4 confirms that in the case of divisible primary resources as well, the flexibility
of transferring primary resource from one program to the other ensures greater welfare for both
programs. In this case, transferring the excess primary resources from one party to the other
increases the infrastructural investments and the net utility surplus of both programs, as both
programs benefit from the flexibility afforded by the transfer of excess primary resources. Hence,
the infrastructural investments for both programs are higher if the primary resource is divisible (in
contrast, if the primary resource is indivisible or expensive, as in the previous section, one program
made the same infrastructural investment (but got a higher utility), while the other program made
a higher infrastructural investment). Also, both programs increase their utility in case a transfer
of primary resources is done; the donor program can count as a surplus the funds that it earns
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from the transfer when it does not utilize the resource, and the program that has acquired the
excess primary resources gets a higher utility from the acquisition of more primary resources as
it is resource constrained (the aid programs only acquire primary resources when their demand
exceeds their available resources). Finally, we analyze the case of a central entity that can purchase
excess primary resources from one aid program, and sell them to the other aid program if required.
3.2.3. Primary Resources Transferable to Central Entity. We now analyze the role
of the central entity in the case where the primary resources are divisible. As before, both aid
programs have the right to sell excess primary resources to the central entity that can then sell
them to the other aid program if required. As before, the central entity pays the individual aid
programs with a fee of pC per unit of the excess primary resources acquired, and if required, sells
these resources to the other program and charges a fee of pS per unit of this resource. The total
response of Programs A and B in this case are given by rˆA and rˆB respectively, which are defined
in the same way as in the previous section. The net utility surplus U¯i of the two aid programs are
then given by:
U¯A =E[uA(xA, rˆA)]− pSE[min{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}] + pC(κA−DA)+−xA
U¯B =E[uB(xB, rˆB)]− pSE[min{(DB −κB)+, (κA−DA)+}] + pC(κB −DB)+−xB
Let x¯A and x¯B be the solution to the infrastructure investment problem of the two programs; that
solution is characterized by dE[ui(xi,rˆi)]
dxi
= 1, where i=A,B. We now compare the net social welfare
of the entire system in Case 3 (the combined net surplus utilities of A and B and of the central
entity) with that in Case 2.
Proposition 5: The net social welfare when the primary resources are transferable between two
programs (Case 2) is less than when the two aid programs can sell their excess resources to a central
entity which can sell the acquired primary resources to the other program (Case 3); that is, Π3 >Π2.
The infrastructural investments of the two aid programs are ranked as follows: x˜i < xˆi < x¯i, i=A,B.
Hence, the infrastructural investments of the two aid programs are the highest in Case 3, and they
are higher in Case 2 than in Case 1. The net social welfare in Case 3 and the infrastructural
investments of the two programs are equal to that of a completely centralized system that employs the
same resource allocation policy and also entails centralized decision making for the infrastructural
investments.
Proposition 5 shows that the central entity can increase the two programs’ infrastructural invest-
ments to levels that exceed those obtained in Case 2. The central entity has two advantages com-
pared to Case 2 where the two programs mutually agree on a resource transfer mechanism without
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the involvement of a third-party. First, the central entity eliminates the loss of efficiency due to the
gaming in the system that occurs in Case 2 because of the bargaining process that determines the
transfer mechanism between the programs. Second, the central entity provides a flexibility source
to the two aid programs that acts like both a salvage value and an emergency supplier: the two
programs can sell any excess primary resources that are not needed to the central entity, as well
as acquire excess primary resources. This enables the two aid programs to invest more in their
infrastructural investment as they have a higher amount of primary resources to provide relief if
needed. Proposition 5 also shows that the net social welfare obtained by Case 3 cannot be improved
upon, and this bears several interesting implications for the design of humanitarian supply chains.
Centralized transfer features a number of advantages (e.g., lower coordination costs, less gaming,
standardization of equipment and quantity discounts from suppliers), as noted in the literature
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009a). We have shown that such systems have the additional
advantage of enabling aid programs to make greater infrastructural investments by relieving those
programs of the need for ex-post bargaining for asset transfer.
Interestingly, in this case as well, the central entity increases overall efficiency by extracting
efficiency gains from within the system, and these gains can be used (if needed) to subsidize a
program’s use of the primary resource. Therefore, this design of a humanitarian logistics system
Pareto-dominates the flexibility mechanism of Case 2.
Corollary 2: The transfer prices of the central entity pS and pC can be set in such a way that
u1i < u
2
i ≤ u3i for i ∈ {A,B}, where uji denotes the expected utility of program i under Case j, and
the central entity does not have a negative expected surplus.
As mentioned previously, this paper takes into account constraints from our field studies: the
existence of earmarked budgets and decentralized decision making. We have shown that the effi-
ciency of humanitarian logistics systems can be improved—while continuing to operate within the
restrictions and principles of donors and other authorities—by a central entity empowered to make
resource transfer decisions. Note that even with the central entity, individual programs make their
own infrastructural investment decisions as well as decisions to sell to and acquire the resource from
the central entity. It is interesting to note that several large International Humanitarian Organiza-
tions (IHO) have recently moved toward such a system, most notably, the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
4. Conclusions, Discussion, and Future Research
Our paper considers the design of a supply chain for humanitarian logistical operations—in terms
of resource preparedness, response, and collaboration—from the perspective of two independent
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aid programs that may need to act in response to future adverse events. We provide policy recom-
mendations for the structural design of humanitarian supply chains, and identify conditions under
which (inter-organizational) agencies that facilitate the transfer of resources between different aid
organizations or programs make the supply chain more efficient. The paper considers two different
kinds of investments: an aid program invests in a primary resource with earmarked funding, one
that is necessary for providing aid but in itself provides no other utility, and makes an additional,
infrastructural investment whose utility is increasing in the amount invested. A simple example
would be vehicles and maintenance facilities with spare parts inventories, and well-trained mechan-
ics. We also model constraints that are widely observed in the field of humanitarian supply chains,
but unfortunately often ignored in academic research: aid programs are strapped for the funds
needed to acquire expensive primary resources ex-ante, donors frequently provide funding that is
earmarked for a specific purpose and, programs maintain autonomy in decision making. In this
context, we consider the problem of resource transfer and infrastructural investments that must
be made under different supply chain designs and then compare the net social welfare obtained in
each of these systems.
We compare three different commonly observed designs of humanitarian supply chains in prac-
tice, and consider both discrete (expensive or indivisible) primary resources and continuous (divisi-
ble) primary resources. We first consider a system in which the two programs operate independently
of each other and without the flexibility to transfer resources—even when one program has no use
for an acquired primary resource. This is our benchmark system, e.g., one organization may be
desperately short of vehicles whereas another may have lots of idle vehicles in the same region. We
then contrast the net social welfare obtained if instead the two programs were allowed to transfer
resources among themselves should the need arise. We show that flexibility in primary resource
transfers increases the system’s net social welfare. Finally, with respect to designing the logistics of
a system for delivering humanitarian aid, we demonstrate that a central entity fulfills two roles: it
eliminates gaming between the aid programs; and it provides an efficient interface for transferring
assets from one program to another.
As mentioned above, some IHO have recently moved or are seriously considering moving to such
a system. Needless to say, these change projects often encounter considerable cultural and political
hurdles since they tend to go against deeply ingrained habits in very decentralized organizations
with multiple donors, poor management information systems, and frequently characterized by a
lack of transparency and trust. Clearly, coordination also comes at a cost, which we chose not
to include here. There may be a cost of setting up collaborations that usually resembles a fixed
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cost owing to the setting up of relationships between partners (Kelly et al. 2002), and a cost of
managing collaborations that resembles a variable transaction cost based on the activities that are
being collaborated upon (Kumar and Van Dissel 1996). However, these implementation issues are
the subject of further research. It is also interesting to note that several initiatives are underway to
create inter-organizational platforms for centralized procurement of expensive assets as suggested
by our results. Given the even larger challenges when trying to create these structures across
organizations, time will tell if they will indeed appear soon. Our guess would be that a higher
frequency of disasters, reduced funding, and increased pressure for more effective use of donor
money will indeed accelerate these developments.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the development of our model is based on obser-
vations of humanitarian supply chains in practice—that is, while considering the constraints under
which these systems operate. Given that aid programs must make up-front investments in different
types of resources that may or may not be used, improving the design of such systems under these
constraints should increase the efficiency of usage of donor funding. Second, we show that systems
with central entities offer efficiency gains over systems that rely on transfer mechanisms between
programs. The central entity plays an important role in all three dimensions (i.e., preparedness,
response, and collaboration) because it enables humanitarian logistics operations to incorporate
them more easily into their resource procurement and allocation functions. This is in stark contrast
to supply chains in the private sector, for whom profit is the primary objective. Although some
corporate supply chains benefit from coordination imposed by a third party, the central entity
described in Case 3 of this paper is more efficient in that it can use its accrued surplus to subsidize
programs in need, thereby increasing net social welfare.
In the early phase of this research, we have identified a number of issues that should be addressed
in future studies. First, while it is plausible that some funds of the aid program may be open-
ended and other funds may be earmarked, for the ease of exposition, we considered all funds to be
earmarked. Future research should investigate the impact of a mix of earmarked and open-ended
funds. Second, future research should also consider the recourse option for aid programs, where
they can request donors for alternate usage of existing earmarked funds. Third, aid programs typ-
ically operate under budget constraints for infrastructural investments as well. Incorporating such
constraints in the current model would lead to obvious results as the infrastructural investments
would either be characterized by the interior point solutions identified in this paper, or by the
budget constraint. However, an interesting extension of this paper would be the combination of
the budget constraint with the recourse option on earmarked funding. Finally, an important issue
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that has not been addressed in this paper is the competition between aid programs for donor
funding, and the associated change in donor behavior from such a competitive interaction between
the aid programs. Future research should consider the impact of these factors on the design of
humanitarian supply chains.
To summarize, our paper represents an early effort in the field of humanitarian supply chain
design. Our results yield normative policy recommendations for improving the design of humani-
tarian supply chains. These findings strongly suggest that partners in the design of such systems
could make better decisions than heretofore concerning the structures used for resource transfer,
and the framework proposed in this paper can serve as a prescriptive model in that regard.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: uA(xA)pA−xA− c is concave, as uA(xA) is strictly concave by assumption.
Hence, the first-order condition for the infrastructural investment xA gives the optimal value of x˜A,
where u′A(x˜A) = 1/pA. Therefore, Π1 = uA(x˜A)pA − x˜A − c. If the primary resource is transferable
(Case 2), Program A’s optimal investment is x˜A, which is the same as Case 1. In the generalized
Nash bargaining framework, the two parties solve: maxpT [uB(xB) − pT ]1−βpβT . This yields pT =
βuB(xB). Program B’s optimal infrastructural investment (xˆB) is given by: (1−β)u′B(xˆB) = 1qB .
The joint utility in this case is Π2 = uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A−c+uB(xˆB)qB− xˆB >uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A−c= Π1.
Proof of Proposition 2 : In Case 3, Program A’s optimal investment is x˜A, which is the same
as Case 1 and 2. Program B’s optimal investment x¯B is characterized by u
′
B(x¯B) =
1
qB
. Since
uB(·) is an increasing concave function, x¯B >x˜B. The joint utility in this case is Π3 = uA(x˜A)pA +
uB(x¯B)qB − x˜A− x¯B − c. Note that by definition of xˆB,
Π3 > uA(x˜A)pA +uB(xˆB)qB − xˆB − x˜A− c= Π2 >Π1.
Hence, Case 3 leads to the highest social welfare for the system.
Proof of Corollary 1: Note that v1A = uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A− c, v2A = uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A− c+βuB(xˆB)qB >
v1A. From Case 3, v
3
A = uA(x˜A)pA− x˜A−c+pC(1−pA). Note that the transfer payment term pC does
not affect the program’s investment decision. Set pC such that βuB(xˆB)qB = pC(1−pA). Therefore,
we have v2A = v
3
A.
Similarly, v2B = (1− β)uB(xˆB)qB − xˆB > 0 = v1B. For Case 3, v3B = uB(x¯B)qB − x¯B − pSqB. Set pS
such that (1−β)uB(xˆB)qB − xˆB = uB(x¯B)qB − x¯B − pSqB. Therefore, we have v2B = v3B.
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Therefore Case 3 Pareto-dominates Cases 1 and 2. From the central entity’s perspective, in the
first two cases there is no cost or utility. In Case 3 the surplus of the central entity is
−pC(1− pA) + pSqB = −βuB(xˆB)qB + uB(x¯B)qB − x¯B − [(1− β)uB(xˆB)qB − xˆB] = uB(x¯B)qB −
x¯B − [uB(xˆB)qB − xˆB]> 0.
Note that the central entity may use this surplus to subsidize the programs by setting pC and
pS in such a way that v
2
i < v
3
i , as its surplus is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 3: In such a centralized system, the total surplus is uA(xA)pA+uB(xB)qB−
xB −xA− c. Therefore the centralized system’s investment problem is
Πc = max
xA,xB≥0
uA(xA)pA +uB(xB)qB −xB −xA− c .
Note that x˜A and x¯B solve the above maximization problem. Therefore, Π3 = Πc.
Proof of Proposition 4: If the excess primary resources are transferred from Program B to Pro-
gram A, using the Generalized Nash bargaining framework, the two parties solve: maxpBAG
β
AG
1−β
B ,
where GA and GB are as defined in Section 3.2.2. This yields:
max
pBA
[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)− pBAmin(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+]β ×
[pBAmin{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}]1−β
On simplification, this yields: (1−β)[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)] = pBAmin(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+,
if min (DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+ > 0, which gives us the result
pBA =
(1−β)[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)]
min{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}
pAB can be shown to be the expression in Section 3.2.2 in a similar manner. Since min{(DA −
κA)
+, (κB −DB)+}= 0 implies that rˆA = r˜A, the net utility Uˆi of the two aid programs are then
given by:
UˆA =E[uA(xA, rˆA)]− (1−β)E[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)] +βE[uB(xB, rˆB)−uB(xB, r˜B)]−xA
UˆB =E[uB(xB, rˆB)]−βE[uB(xB, rˆB)−uB(xB, r˜B)] + (1−β)E[uA(xA, rˆA)−uA(xA, r˜A)]−xB
The optimal values of the infrastructural investments xˆA and xˆB of Programs A and B are given
by dE[uA(xA,rˆA)]
dxA
− (1− β)dE[uA(xA,rˆA)−uA(xA,r˜A)]
dxA
= 1, and dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)]
dxB
− β dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)−uB(xB ,r˜B)]
dxB
= 1
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respectively. Note that since rˆA ≥ r˜A, E[uA(xA, rˆA)] > E[uA(xA, r˜A)]. Since the response and the
infrastructure investment are assumed to be complements, dE[uA(xA,rˆA)]
dxA
> dE[uA(xA,r˜A)]
dxA
. Therefore,
xˆA > x˜A. In a similar vein, xˆB > x˜B. All second order conditions are satisfied by our assumption of
concavity on the utility functions. The net social welfare of the system is:
Π2 = βE[uA(xˆA, rˆA)] + (1−β)E[uA(xˆA, r˜A)]− xˆA + (1−β)E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)] +βE[uB(xˆB, r˜B)]− xˆB
Now, βE[uA(xˆA, rˆA)] + (1 − β)E[uA(xˆA, r˜A)] − xˆA > βE[uA(x˜A, rˆA)] + (1 − β)E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] − x˜A
by definition of xˆA. Also, βE[uA(x˜A, rˆA)] + (1 − β)E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] − x˜A > βE[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] + (1 −
β)E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)]− x˜A =E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)]− x˜A. Similarly, (1−β)E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)]+βE[uB(xˆB, r˜B)]− xˆB >
E[uB(x˜B, r˜B)]− x˜B. Hence,
Π2 >E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] +E[uB(x˜B, r˜B)]− x˜A− x˜B = Π1
Proof of Proposition 5 : In Case 3, the infrastructural investment problem of the two aid programs
is given by:
U¯A =E[uA(xA, rˆA)]− pSE[min{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}] + pCE[(κA−DA)+]−xA
U¯B =E[uB(xB, rˆB)]− pSE[min{(DB −κB)+, (κA−DA)+}] + pCE[(κB −DB)+]−xB
Hence, the optimal investments of the two programs (x¯A, x¯B) are characterized by:
dE[uA(xA,rˆA)]
dxA
= 1
and dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)]
dxB
= 1 respectively. All second order conditions are satisfied by our assumption
of concavity on the utility functions. Since dE[ui(xi,rˆi)]
dxi
> dE[ui(xi,r˜i)]
dxi
and the utility functions are
concave, it follows that x¯A > xˆA and x¯B > xˆB, by their characterizing equations. The problem of
the centrally coordinated system is given by:
maxxA,xB E[uA(xA, rˆA) + uB(xB, rˆB)]− xA − xB, as there are no transfer costs in the centrally
coordinated system. Let x∗A and x
∗
B denote the optimal infrastructural investments in the centrally
coordinated system. The system optimal infrastructural costs x∗A and x
∗
B are characterized by are
characterized by: dE[uA(xA,rˆA)]
dxA
= 1 and dE[uB(xB ,rˆB)]
dxB
= 1. Hence, x¯A = x
∗
A and x¯B = x
∗
B.
The net social welfare in Case 3 is given by the sum of the utility surplus of the two aid programs
and the central entity.
Π3 = E[uA(x¯A, rˆA)]− x¯A +E[uB(x¯B, rˆB)]− x¯B = ΠC , where ΠC is the net social welfare of the
centrally coordinated system. From the proof of Proposition 4, the net social surplus in Case 2 is
Π2 = βE[uA(xˆA, rˆA)] + (1−β)E[uA(xˆA, r˜A)]− xˆA + (1−β)E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)] +βE[uB(xˆB, r˜B)]− xˆB
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= β(E[uA(xˆA, rˆA)]− xˆA +E[uB(xˆB, r˜B)]− xˆB) + (1−β)(E[uA(xˆA, r˜A)]− xˆA +E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)]− xˆB)
< E[uA(xˆA, rˆA)]− xˆA +E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)]− xˆB
< E[uA(x
∗
A, rˆA)]−x∗A +E[uB(x∗B, rˆB)]−x∗B
= Π3
Proof of Corollary 2: We begin by showing that u2i > u
1
i for i ∈ {A,B}. From the proof of
Proposition 4 we know that, u2A = βE[uA(xˆA, rˆA)] + (1− β)E[uA(xˆA, r˜A)]− xˆA > βE[uA(x˜A, rˆA)] +
(1 − β)E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] − x˜A > E[uA(x˜A, r˜A)] − x˜A = u1A.Similarly, u2B = (1 − β)E[uB(xˆB, rˆB)] +
βE[uB(xˆB, r˜B)]− xˆB >E[uB(x˜B, r˜B)]− x˜B = u1B.
We set pC and pS such that
u2A ≤E[uA(x¯A, rˆA)]− pSE[min{(DA−κA)+, (κB −DB)+}] + pCE[(κA−DA)+]− x¯A (1)
u2B ≤E[uB(x¯B, rˆB)]− pSE[min{(DB −κB)+, (κA−DA)+}] + pCE[(κB −DB)+]− x¯B (2)
Let Xi = E[ui(x¯i, rˆi)] − x¯i − u2i , TA = E[min{(DA − κA)+, (κB − DB)+}], TB = E[min{(DB −
κB)
+, (κA−DA)+}], and Zi =E[(κi−Di)+]. Inequalities (1) and (2) above can be re-written as
XA− pSTA + pCZA ≥ 0 (3)
XB − pSTB + pCZB ≥ 0 (4)
Solving these yields the following expressions for pC and pS.
pS ≤ XA + pCZATA (5)
pS ≤ XB + pCZBTB (6)
We also need to ensure that the central entity’s expected surplus is non-negative. This implies that
UCE =−pC(ZA +ZB) + pS(TA + TB)≥ 0. This implies the following inequality
pS ≥ pCZA +ZBTA + TB (7)
To show that ∃{pS, pC} that satisfy inequalities (5), (6), and (7) it is sufficient to show that ∃pC ≥ 0
such that
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XA + pCZA
TA ≥ pC
ZA +ZB
TA + TB (8)
XB + pCZB
TB ≥ pC
ZA +ZB
TA + TB (9)
Inequalities (8) and (9) can be re-written as
XA(TA + TB)≥ pC(ZBTA−ZATB) (10)
XB(TA + TB)≥ pC(ZATB −ZBTA) (11)
If ZBTA −ZATB < 0 then Inequality (10) is satisfied for all pC ≥ 0 as XA,TA,TB ≥ 0. In this case
ZATB −ZBTA > 0, and hence 0 ≤ pC ≤ XB(TA+TB)(ZATB−ZBTA) satisfies the sufficient conditions. Similarly,
ff ZBTA −ZATB > 0 then Inequality (11) is satisfied for all pC ≥ 0 as XB,TA,TB ≥ 0. In this case
0≤ pC ≤ XA(TA+TB)(ZBTA−ZATB) satisfies the sufficient conditions. Finally, if ZBTA−ZATB = 0, then all values
of pC ≥ 0 satisfy the sufficient conditions. Therefore, ∃pS, pC such that u3i ≥ u2i for i ∈ {A,B} and
UCE ≥ 0.
   
